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ABSTRACT 
Recent changes in economic and political organization in the Chinese countryside 
are producing a new basis for inquiry into congruence between village leaders and those 
who choose them 一 namely， their electorates of ordinary villagers and selectorates of 
leaders at the higher township level. This paper draws on 1990 survey data to analyze 
the connection between village leaders and their electorates and selectorates, in terms 
of congruence of positions along an economic ideology dimension measuring orientations 
to the importance of state management relative to private individual initiative in 
economic developmen t. Results of multivariate regression ånalyses of congruence in 
terms of responsiveness, proximity, and centrism indicate: (1) there is significant 
congruence beMeen village leaders and their electorates and selectorates along the 
dimension, and (ρ2勾) inte叮r句
electorates results in s討19n1自cant par此t from institutions and attitudes associated with e缸or此ts
a前t grassroots democratization . 
IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE IN THE CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE: 
VILLAGE LEADERS AND THEIR ELECTORATES AND SELECTORATES 
Quantitative empirical inquiry into congruence between political leaders and 
ordinary citizens has contributed signi自cantly to our knowledge about fundamental 
political processes in liberal democracies (see esp. Miller and Stokes 1963, Achen 1978, 
Powell 1982, Dalton 1985, Huber and Po\vell 1994). Such inquiry takes as its point of 
departure the following c1 aim: leaders are outcomes of a con1petitive political process 
ln日uenced in large part by preferences of voters for particular policies. Analysis of 
congruence between leaders and citizens evaluates the quality of representation , by 
measuring the extent to \vhich the electoral connection in fact produces a policy 
connection , usua l1y as re f1 ected in significant agreenlent bet\veen citizens and elected 
leaders (or gov閃el臼n叩
sonle Ineasure, leaders in liberal democracies are supposed to be c10se to the center of 
their constituencies. 
Without the theoretical premise of an electoral connection, there seen1S to be 
little to motivate analysis of congruence. This is the nlain explanation for the lack of 
cOlllparable studies in communist states. Indeed, the key mechanism connecting leaders 
and citizens in those states is not designed to transform nlass preferences into public 
policy (see Meyer 1957, Lindblom 1977, Dahl 1989). Put simply, the basic theolY 
sustaining the communist c1aim to legitimate authority presumes communist leadership 
is representative in the following sense: communist par可 members comprise an 
enlightened revolutionary vanguard that alone is able to comprehend and represent the 
objective long-term interests of the masses. Depending on the level of econon1Îc 
development and mass revolutionary consciousness, however, those interests nlay not 
correspond c10sely to some aggregation of preferences of ordinary citizens. Accordingly, 
the guarantee that communist leaders represent nlass interests is not the test of regular 
electoral competition, but the e旺ective monopoly of power by a hierarchically organized, 
intemally disciplined, politically correct communist party elite (Lenin 1902, 1904, 1919). 
Elections in communist states are not, then, in conception or practice, public 
policy contests. Nor does the Leninist 台amework allo\v electoral challenges to the 
leading role of the communist party: elections are organized as fully predictable 
plebiscites or limited-choice elections (see Pravda 1978), in which the range of outcomes 
is restricted to candidates vetted and approved by communist party selectorates at higher 
levels. Such an arrangenlent suggests congruence between elected leaders and their 
selectorates, rather than electorates, but conditions for political survey research in 
conlmunist states have generalIy not been conducive to inquiry into congruence of any 
sort. 
Recent changes in economic and political organization in the Chinese countryside 
are producing a new basis for inquiry into congruence bet\veen leaders at the rural 
grassroots and those who choose thenl -- namely, their electorates of ordinary villagers 
and selectorates of leaders at the higher township level. At the same time, improved 
circumstances for research have made such an inquiry possible. This paper draws on a 
unique set of survey data to analyze the connection between village leaders and their 
electorates and selectorates, in terms of congruence of positions along an economic 
ideology dimension measuring orientations to a basic question of political economy: the 
importance of state management relative to private individual initiative in econonlic 
development. 
The data analyzed here are 台om a sample of 56 Chinese villages surveyed in 1990, 
some 仰o years after passage of a law establishing popularly elected village committees 
as autonomous organizations of power in the countryside. The analysis of congruence 
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exploits a feature of the data set unique to sU lVey research on mainland China. This is 
the combination of a nested sampIing design (permitting a matching of vilIage leaders 
with those who choose them) and the commonality of many questionnaire items to elite 
and n1ass inte lViews (permitting a matching of responses to the same items). The 
sampling design nests vilIages within 趴'enty townships and four counties.1 Speci且c
analyses of congruence compare self-placement of viIIage leaders with self-placement of 
respondents sampled from their respective viIIage electorates and township selectorates, 
along the economic ideology dimension. 
1 begin below with a brief summaly of recent changes in rural economic and 
political organization and a discussion of their implications for inquiry into congruence 
be趴'een vi I1age leaders and those who choose them. An introduction to the economic 
ideology din1ension foIIo\vs. The analytical body of the paper consists of multivariate 
regression analyses of congruence along the dimension , using as dependent variables 
Achen's (1978) measures of congruence in terms of responsiveness, proximity, and 
centrism. The first analyses inquire into the existence of substantively and statisticaIIy 
significant congruence. Finding signi且cant congruence between viIIage leaders and their 
electorates and selectorates, 1 consider the relationship between congruence and recent 
e旺'orts at grassroots democratization, focusing on congruence between viIIage leaders and 
viIIagers. In these analyses, 1 try to explain inter-viIIage variation in congruence, testing 
hypotheses implicit in Chinese accounts of democratization in the vilIages. 
The Changing Context of Vi lIage Leadership 
Agricultural decoIIectivization was one of the earliest and most consequential 
changes adopted in the reform period that began in 1978. With the decoIIectivization , 
rural communes and their subordinate production brigades (and teams) were disman t1ed 
and replaced by township governments and vilIage committees, respectively (see table 1). 
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Land and other production inputs were divided among peasant households to. manage 
on their own，台ee markets were reopened , most obligatory sales to the state were 
abolished, and private entrepreneurship was promoted. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The new incentive structure for agricultural production quickly proved successful 
by lnost economic standards, but its consequences for leadership at the rural grassroots 
were very serious. Decollectivization enorn10usly weakened tbe power of tbe state to 
exact cOlnpliance fron1 peasants, the state's hold over village leaders, and the dependence 
of villagers on those leaders (see Unger 1989). Peasants continued to rely somewhat on 
leaders for favorable allocation of production inputs, marketing opportunities, and other 
resources (Oi 1986a, 1986b, 1989), but the basic terms of the implicit contract changed 
once peasant incomes ceased to be a residual of the collective labor produc1. 
The 1982 Constitution had introduced autonomous village comn1ittees to manage 
the villages, but the official e在'ort had essentially ended at tha1. By the mid-1980s, village 
leadership had atropbied to a degree that caused concern among policymakers in Beijing. 
Village meetings were rarely convened, peasants resisted e旺'orts by village leaders to 
implement important but unpopular directives (such as family planning) , tensions and 
violent con f1 icts between villagers and village leaders bad become common , many village 
leaders had abdicated their po.s.itions of leadership to enrich themselves as specialized 
producers or entrepreneurs, and others had stayed in their positions to enrich themselves 
througb illicit means (see esp. Zheng 1989, White 1992). 
To rebuild organizations and leadership at the rural grassroots, the Legal A旺airs
Commission ofthe National People's Congress and the Ministry of CiviI A旺airs proposed 
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to reform the vilIage comlnittees. The controversial grassroots democratization measures 
proposed to increase accountability of vilIage leaders to vilIagers and establish the rights 
and responsibilities of vilIages in their relationship with the townships. Much of the 
controversy in the national legislature focused on the relationship between vilIage 
committees and township governments: some deputies feared that elected committees 
\vould not selve state interests or help implement policies handed do\vn by the townships; 
other deputies called for nlore autonomy and greater empowerment of the committees 
against the encroachlnents of township governments (see O'Brien 1994). 
In 1987, after over a year of debate, the National People's Congress passed a draft 
law on village C0 I11I11Îttees, e旺ective in June 1988. The law de自ned vilIage c0111mittees 
as nlass organizations of self-government at the grassroots, popularly elected and 
accountable to a village council comprised of all adult villagers. Village cOlnlnittees of 
three to seven nlembers were to be nlade up of a director, deputy director, and ordinary 
committee nlembers, a11 elected to three-year terms. Village conlmittees were to help 
township governments to carry out their work, but, significantly, the committees were not 
placed formally under the leadership of the townships or local party organizations 
(Standing Comnlittee of the Sixth National People's Congress 24 Nov. 1987). 
。在'ering villagers electoral choices was, and is, a key component of grassroots 
democratization. O'Brien (1994) notes that official guidelines have calIed for village 
committee elections to feature some choice among candidates, with the result that most 
vilIages have held senli-competitive elections (featuring one or Í\vo more candidates than 
positions) and some have experimented with fully competitive elections (listing twice the 
number of candidates as position斗 By the end of 1990, rudimentary elected village 
committees had by and large replaced the old committees: newly elected village 
committees numbered over a million , vilIage leaders over four million (see table 1). 
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Implications for Congruence 
To the extent that interested vilIagers participate 台eely in competitive elections 
that decide who leads vilIages, it nlakes sense to inquire into (and expect) congruence, 
along some relevant dimension, be t\veen vilIage leaders and vilIagers. Yet, as Chinese 
officials acknowledge, grassroots democratization is a longterm process, it began not long 
ago, and progress has been uneven. Leaders at the township level, who are charged with 
organizing vilIage elections, have their own interests to secure. Overlapping lnemberships 
on vilIage party branches and vilIage committees are conlnlon. Some vilIage committee 
elections are uncompetitive, l110st only selni-competitive. Practically none feature 
calnpaigns. Given this state of a在'airs ， \vhat are the real inlplications for congruence at 
the rural grassroots? 
Consider first the role of selectorates. The governnlent departInent specifically 
charged with inlplelnenting grassroots democratization and charting its progress is the 
Ministry of CiviI A釘airs . Chinese accounts of township involvement in village elections 
after 1987 sometimes mention party committees, but practically always refer to 
governments, which have overall responsibiIity for setting up vilIage committees. Election 
outcomes 0征訂趴70 indications that township leaders do not leave vilIage elections 
entirely to the vagaries of electorates: vilIage committees usualIy have representative 
quotas of women (and minorities in vilIages with minorities) , and elected village leaders 
are usualIy also village pa向， branch leaders (Liaoning Provincial Department of Civil 
A在'airs 1989, Du 1990, Zhang .1992). 
In the usual sense of the term in communist politics, a selectorate is a communist 
par可 committee (and its organization department) , which has the authority to control 
ent句， promotion, demotion, and eXÎt of 0伍cials for all positions on its assigned 
nomenk1atura (see Manion 1984, 1985, Burns 1987, 1989). After 1979, when electoral 
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reform for elections to people's congresses (i.e. , above the viIIage level) 。旺ered voters 
some choice among candidates and a chance to elect non-party menlbers as 
representatives, communist party committees functioned as selectorates by vetting 
candidates for poIitical correctness (Nathan 1985, Womack 1982, 1982-83, Jacobs 1985, 
1991). Township party committees are not selectorates for viIIage leaders in the usual 
sense, however, because viIIage leaders are not state cadres and are not on a 
non1enklatura. 
Nonetheless, township party and government leaders have a nUlnber of ways to 
in f1uence the selection process in viIIage elections. In extraordinary circumstances, if 
village conl1nittees are "paralyzed ," township governlnents have the authority (indeed the 
duty) to dislnantle theIn , conduct investigations, and ensure that capable village leaders 
are elected -- \vhich can involve sending in their own candidates frOIn outside (Chen 
1990, Shi 1990, Cui and Zhang 1990). More conlmonly, township governInents and party 
committees function as selectorates by influencing candidate nonlination and 
monopolizing candidate vetting. In selecting candidates, township leaders consider the 
performance of village incumbents and rely on suggestions (and candidates) 台om the 
viIIage party branches. Candidate . nomination is also supposed to include a process of 
"deliberation" and "consultation," in which viIlagers are mobilized in groups to suggest 
and discuss potential candidates. Township leaders play a 1110re direct role as 
selectorates in the process of vetting potential candidates and reducing the number on 
the baIlot to one or a few mOJ.e candidates than positions (see esp. Fujian Provincial 
Department of Civil A証airs 1990). 
But if the above implies congruence between village leaders and their selectorates, 
it does not necessarily inlply a lack of congruence between village leaders and their 
electorates. Although some townships do organize uncompetitive elections, essentially 
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continuing the old practices of direct appointment and dislDissal (Zhang and Xiao 1992), 
most townships are weaker in their capacity as selectorates. Selectorates can influence 
who appears on the ballots, but winning votes of villagers in semi-competitive elections 
is generally the only way village leaders can gain office. Many provinces require that 
village leaders win votes of a m吋ority of eligible voters (see, e.g., Standing Committee 
of the Seventh Fujian Provincial People's Congress 26 Dec. 1990). Villagers have 
withheld votes for candidates supported by the townships and successfully resisted 
township efforts to disman t1e "paralyzed" committees (Cunmin zhijie minzhu de you yi 
ci shijian 1991). Even candidates \vho do not measure up in the political vetting process 
have been elected as viIlage leaders (Li 1990). 
Chinese elections do not feature campaigns, a fact that can have major 
in1plications for congruence be1:\veen leaders and citizens. Villages are relatively small 
units, however: 1990 average vilIage size was about 1200 (State StatisticaI Bureau 1993: 
40) . Most adult villagers have Iived and worked together for lDost of their lives. Even 
\vithout campaigns, villagers are likely to know candidates personally. Familiarity in a 
small community context provides a basis for choosing Ieaders; it also creates incentives 
for responsiveness to villagers. White (1992) observes that because village leaders and 
their families remain in the community after their term is up, leaders are reluctant to 
n1ake enelnies \vhile in 。但ce .
To some degree, township selectorates can also find it in their interest to pay 
attention to the electoral prefeJences of villagers. Township leaders fear that vilIage 
leaders will be responsive to the peasants who elect them, at the expense of the higher-
level authorities who rely on them as their "1egs" in grassroots implementation (Shi 1990). 
Village leaders may be ultimately unsuccessful with coercive means to enforce 
compliance with below-market grain procurement, family planning, colIection of taxes 
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and local levies, recruitn1ent of unpaid labor, and other unpopu叫la訂r measures (Zhen 
1989, Zha咚 1992). Implementation may require active cooperation 台om vi11agers. 
Leaders who use coercion to implement unpopular measures may not initia11y lose 
township support, but they can (and do) lose vi11age elections (Yueping County 1990, 
Cunmin zhijie mi血hu de you yi ci shijian 1991). In vi11age elections, townships can fail 
as selectorates if they incorrectly anticipate electoral support for candidates. Failure 
after elections can be far lnore consequential, however: if elected viIlage leaders cannot 
elicit cooperation froln vi11agers, to\vnships lose their "legs." 
In sun1, the electoral connection in the Chinese countryside, however problematic, 
is in principle su伍ciently strong to motivate an inquüy into congruence between village 
leaders and t110se who choose theln , inc1uding ordinary viIlagers. Quite apart from that 
rationale, however, studies of village life before decolIectivization and den1ocratization 
suggest t11at congruence in the Chinese village context can elnerge through informal 
n1echanisms -- as a product of comn1unity and culture, for lack of better terms. Before 
the reforms, rural administration was highly centralized, but each successively lower level 
was more responsive to demands frOD1 belo\v (Unger 1989). A1 though COlllmune party 
committees dominated selection of production brigade leaders, those selected had a11 
nsen 台om the local peasant community. According to observers of vi11age poIitics, 
brigade leaders identified c10sely with their vi11age community and, when possible, sided 
with vi11agers against the encroachment of the state or rival communities (Bums 1988, 
Shue 1988). Vi11agers in f1uenc.ed leaders mainly through informal means, by threats of 
social ostracism or non-compliance, for example (Parish and Whyte 1978, Burns 1988). 
Pre-reform in f1uence by peasants has nothing at a11 to do with a presumed electoral 
connection -- and an electoral connection by no means signifies an end to informal 
in f]uence in the villages. There is more than one way to arrive at congruence between 
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village leaders and villagers. 
Economic Ideology 
The appropriate role of the state, relative to private individuals, as the agent to 
promote and manage economic development, is a policy-relevant issue of considerable 
inlportance in advanced industrialized democracies. For good reason, political scientists 
treat it as a key conlponent of ideological orientation in those countries, with positions 
on the issue corresponding to positions on the left-right dimension (see Huber 1989). 
It is also a suitable focus for the analysis of congruence in the very di旺'erent context of 
the Chinese viIIage, especially as a general left-right dinlension is not a useful survey 
nleasure in tbat context.2 
More so than in advanced industrialized democracies. the econonlic role of the 
state is the core policy issue in countries long dominated by central planning and state 
o\vnership -- nlost of \vhich are rnaking serious e旺'orts to decentralize, marketize, and 
privatize. For the Chinese , a1ready in their second decade of economic refonn , it has 
becorne an issue of widespread relevance. Chinese industrial reforms have not included 
privatization of state enterp討ses ， but a main thrust of the reforms has been to promote 
the growth of coIIective and private enterprises, to reduce the proportionate size of the 
state sector. Despite some anti-market orientations among conservative leaders, 0伍cial
policy in the reform period has been "sustained promotion" of the private sector. This 
has resulted in private enterprises emerging as an integral part of the economy by the 
late 1980s (Young 1991). In the countryside, an estimated one in seven households were 
owners of private enterprises by 1989 (Odegaard 1992).3 
The relative importance of the state and private individual initiative in the 
economy is a particularly good focus for analysis of congruence between viIIage leaders 
and those who choose them. Village leaders act as economic managers of "small, multi-
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dimensional businesses" (the villages), adapting economic directives to local conditions 
to meet a variety of coIlective and personal goals (see esp. RozeIle 1994). ViIlage leaders 
have many responsibiIities, but promoting viIlage economic development and creating an 
environment in which viIlagers can enrich themselves are among their lnost important 
functions (Zhang 1992). State assignments such as family planning, labor conscription, 
and grain procurelnent are also important and undoubtedly shape the relationship 
between leaders and ordinary villagers in important (and di旺'erent) \vays. Yet, those 
unpopular tasks 0証'er viIIage leaders comparatively little legitin1ate scope for 
interpretation or innovative inlplementation. They are fairly rigid obligations handed 
down the administrative hierarchy by township governlnents. By contrast, in providing 
econo I11ic leade叫坤， viIlage leaders have a range of choices (pennissible and not) 
reflecting fundalnenta lIy di旺erent notions about the best way to develop the economy. 
Characterizing the econo111ic decisionmaking of local leaders in the countryside, RozelIe 
(1994: 124) refers to a "deep ambivalence" ofviIIage (and townsl中) leaders towards the 
n1arket. Clearly, speci自c econonlic choices of viIlage leaders can reflect a wide range of 
orientations to the basic issue of the economic role of the state, relative to pl甘ate
individual initiative. 
To measure positions on this issue, 1 used responses to questions about the 
importance of state and individual private enterprises for economic development. 1 
argue below for a broad interpretation of responses, as positions on an economlC 
ideology dimension. The position of a leader or ordinary villager on the economic 
ideology dimension is the di在'erence between his responses to the following questions: 
Here is a scale. The "0" on the scale indicates no importance and the "10" 
indicates extreme importance. How important would you say state 
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ente1'prises (guoying qiye) are for economic development? 
How important \vould you say individual [i.e., p1'ivate] ente叩rises (geti q秒。
are for economic development?4 
Employing responses to both questions takes into account idiosyncratic di旺erences ln 
implicit scales fo1' evaluation (that, for example, one respondent's "9" may be 
substantively equivalent to another's "8"). 
The analyses of congruence below ell1ploy responses of vilIage1's and their elected 
leaders in 56 vilIages, as \ve lI as leaders at the highe1' to'wnship level. A11 of the villages 
surveyed had unde1'gone a round of elections since mid-1988, when the la\v on village 
COnlJl1ittees 0血cially calne Ínto e証'ect. The nlass sanlple, considered here as a sall1ple 
of electorates for their respective village C0111 J11ittees, is a sinlple randonl sall1ple of 
resident adult vi l1 age臼rs. The 56 elected vi l1age leaders sUlveyed are a non-probabili 句吵f 
salllp抖le亡 19 are directors of t白heir village c∞oll1ml圳ttεes; 37 are village communist party 
branch secretaries who serve concurrently as deputy directors 01' lnembers of village 
cOll1mittees. The 40 township leaders surveyed are considered here as a sample of 
selectorates for leaders in villages under their respective jurisdictions. They are a non-
probability sample, consisting of a communist party secretary or deputy secretary and a 
township gove1'nment head or deputy head in each of the twenty townships surveyed.5 
Table 2 reports frequency distributions for positions on the dimension , separately 
fo1' ordinary villagers, village leaders, and township leade1's surveyed.6 No claim of 
gene1'alizability is made for these descriptive results, because of the nature of the sample 
(see Manion 1994). Interpreted narrowly, po圳ons are evaluations of the additional 
inlportance of state enterprises for economic development, relative to individual 
enterprises. Positive positions assign greater inlportance to state ente1'p1'ises than to 
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individual enterprises. For this sample, this is the prevailing view in a11 three groups of 
respondents: it accounts for 75 percent of mass responses and 88 percent of responses 
for both groups of leaders. Negative positions, by contrast, re f1ect the view that 
individual enterprises are relatively more important. A position of zero assigns equal 
importance to the 趴'0 forms of enterprises. AInong the three groups sUlVeyed, the 
relative importance of individual enterprises is evaluated most highly by ordinary 
villagers, less highly by village leaders, and least highly by to\vnship leaders. Although 
leaders do not employ the lo\ver end of the dimension, the distributions appear to re f1ect 
a fairly \vide range of positions.7 
[Table 2 about here] 
Positions on the dÌInension , even in the narrow interpretation above, are of 
obvious intrinsic interest. This paper presumes that they are also interpretable n10re 
broadly, as ideological orientatio l1s to a basic question of political economy. The 
presumption that the dünension is broadly lneaningful , representing economic ideological 
orientations rather than views on a speci自c question about enterprises, can be examined 
empirically. If positions on the dimension do in fact provide information about views on 
related questions, then econon1ic ideo]ogy can be expected to predict those views in a 
way that makes sense (in terms of direction) and satisfies tests of statistical significance. 
Moreover, if positions on the dimension predict views on related questions, it not only 
supports the presumption that the din1ension is broadly meaningful , but also indicates 
that the questions used to construct the dimension were generally comprehended. That 
is, it addresses the concern that positions on the dimension may simply re f]ect random 
responses, a concern that is not unreasonable considering the fairly abstract qua]ity of 
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the questions and fairIy low educational level of mass respondents. 
Respondents in the mass sample were asked a number of questions that tap 
orientations to econonlic reforms in the past decade and their outcomes. 1 speci自ed
responses to these questions as dependent variables in separate regression equations, 
with position on the economic ideology dimension and several demographic control 
variables (sex, age, education, and household income) specified as independent variables. 
The general finding of the exercise is reassuring: knowing a viIIager's econolllic ideology 
is of signi自cant use in predicting his views on related issues. Results of the specific 
regression analyses indicate that, relative to other viIIagers, those who place a higher 
value on the inlportance of state enterprises for econonlic developnlent: perceive the 
e旺ects of econonlic refornls as 1110re detrimental , assess opportunities provided by 
marketization more negatively, more strongly associate l11arketization with rising prices, 
have a lower appraisal of the usefulness of individual enterprises, and are less tolerant 
of large income inequalities generaIIy and higher than average incollles for individual 
entrepreneurs speci自cally. In addition , higher evaluations of the importance of state 
enterprises for economic developnlent are associated with signi自cantly worse "feelings" 
towards households that have prospered greatly under the rural economic reforms (wan 
yuan hu) and towards private retailers (佔ge伊t仰t
a broad interpretation of positions on the ec∞onoml此c ideology d刮imension as a measure of 
the direction and strength of 0叮n記en削ta刮ti必O∞n郎s tωo state management r昀elat趴ive tωo private 
individual initiative in economic development. 
Choosing a Measure of Central Tendency 
Analysis of congruence examines how close leaders are to the center of their 
constituencies. In aggregating positions of the electorate, more recent studies of 
congruence usuaIIy take into account the different impIications of the mean and median 
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as measures of central tendency.9 As analyses of congruence are motivated in large part 
by a normative interest in the quali句 of representation in the system, it is \vorthwhile to 
consider the normative implications of the di旺'erent measures when the mean and 
median do not coincide. From a normative perspective, the mean has the intuitive 
appeal of a focus on congruence between leaders and the average citizen. This appeal 
is weakened, however, by an early 1'esult of social choice theory: on a single dimension 
and assuming single-peaked preferences, the lnedian is the only position a majo1'ity 
prefers to all others (see Black 1948). Moreove1', compared to the median , the mean 
gives g1'eate1' weight to positions fa 1'the1' f1'om the center. T-his p1'esents a no1'mative 
rationale fo 1' choosi時 the median ove1' the nlean: as Hube1' and Po\vell (1994: 296) 
argue , there is "no justification in democratic theory fo 1' pernlitting mino1'ities to prevail 
over majo1'ities or for giving greater weight to ideologically extrelne citizens." 
F1'onl a positive perspective, the spatial theory of elections 0旺'ers di旺erent
predictions (depending on the nunlber of cOlnpetitors and the electoral systenl) about 
where candidates or parties wi lI position themselves, relative to the electorate, on a 
dinlension. Applying the Hotelli時 model to the study of politics, Downs (1957) showed 
that cOlnpetition to nlaXÌnlize votes inlpels both pa1'ties in a t\vo-pa1'ty system to c1uster 
a1'ound the position of tbe median voter. Advances in spatial tbeory have since 
demonstrated that pa1'ties in a multipar句 context have incentives to compete by 
dispersing, with greater centrifugal incentives in systems with more competitors (Cox 
1987, 1990). But wbether candidates 0 1' pa1'ties compete by buncbing at the median or 
dispersing along an ideological dinlension, the competitor at tbe median is the predicted 
\vinner, in some sense of the tenn: unde1' plurality electoral rules where only one 
competitor can win, tbe predicted winner is the one nearest tbe median; under 
proportional representation , \vhere no single par可 is likely to win a majority of seats, the 
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median party can be expected to dominate government formation (Laver and Schofield 
1990: 89-143). 
A spatial model of elections in Chinese villages is outside the scope of this paper. 
More to the point, such a model would not 0旺'er positive theoretical guidance here in 
the form of a prediction that leaders in the sample are closer to the lnedian position of 
villagers than to the mean , or vice versa. lO Village leaders are elected by plurality rules 
through a bloc vote procedure, in which vilIagers cast votes (in one or two separate 
elections) for severalleaders: a director, deputy director, and as n1any other candidates 
for the vilIage cOIllmittee as there are positions. ll In villåges \vith some electoral 
cOlnpetition, more than three candidates are nominated for cOlnmittee positions and at 
least three are elected. Assun1Îng villagers vote for candidates nearest to their own 
positions, \vinners can be predicted to be nearer to the village Inedian than losers. A 
vi lIage leader in the sample he院 however， is a draw of one of at least three (and as 
n1any as seven) winning candidates in the village. Among \vinners, the vilIage leader in 
the sample here can be the one furthest from the vi lIage median. Depending on the 
shape of the distribution of positions of vilIagers, vilIage leaders in the sample can be 
nearer to the village n1ean than to the median. 
Further, congruence in the Chinese village context can also be a product of non-
voting processes, some of \vhich suggest the mean can be the more suitable prediction. 
For example, if wealthy vilIagers are in t1uential villagers and if wealth is associated with 
private entrepreneurship, the most in t1uential villagers may be those with the most 
extreme posltlons. 
Without a c1ear positive theoretical rationale or normative expectations to 
recommend one measure of central tendency over another, 1 begin the analysis of 
congruence below by specifying two models: one using tbe median as tbe aggregate 
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measure for positions of vi lIagers, the other using the mean. 
Congruence Beh\'een Village Leaders and Their Electorates and Selectorates 
The analyses in this section inquire into the existence of statisticalIy and 
substantively signi自cant congruence between vil1age leaders and their electorates and 
selectorates, asking: do electorates and selectorates of vilIage leaders matter, in a way 
tapped by the econo111ic ideology dimension? Analyses of congruence in established 
Iiberal den10cracies can reasonably assume signi自cant congruence, as a product of 
democratic processes, and focus instead on estin1ating the amount of congruence in the 
system or comparing congruence across institutional variants .of liberal democracy. In 
the Chinese vi lIage context of 1990, however, it is quite clearIy possible tbat neither 
electorates nor selectorates nlatter 一 or that they do matter, but in a \vay not re f1ected 
in economic ideology. 
1 inquire into the existence of congruence through nlultivariate regression , \vith 
vi lIage leader position on tbe economic ideology din1ension as the dependent variable. 
The independent variables that test the hypotheses of analytic interest are aggregate 
n1easures of the positions of ordinary vi lIagers (i.e. , electo別的) and township leaders 
(i.e. , selectorates) on the dimension . Employing Ache的 (1978) notion and measure of 
congruence as responsiveness, the analyses estimate the degree to which vilIage leaders 
can be considered responsive to those who choose them. Thus coefficients for the 1\vo 
independent variables described are interpretable as amounts by which a vi lIage leader 
can be expected to change bis position as his electorate or selectorate changes position 
by one unit on the economic ideology dimension , other things equal. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis using sample vi lIage mean (or 
median) po圳ons on the dimension as an independent variable presents two kinds of 
estimation problems. Both result 台om constructing the independent variable as an 
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aggregate nleaSUre based on smaI1 samples at the village level. The 自rst is a 
heteroskedastici句， problem: di宜erent sample variances of village mean (and median) 
positions wiI1 produce inefficient estimates and overly optimistic standard errors. The 
second is an error-in-variable problem: estinlates of village population means (and 
medians) contain nleasurement error, which wiI1 produce underestimates of the 
coe出cient for village mean (and median) positions. The conventional approach to 
correcting for heteroskedasticity is weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis. 
Independent variables are weighted by the reciprocal of the square root of their 
variances, so that obseIVations with large variances have less iIhpact on the analysis than 
those \vith snlall variances. For the analyses below, 1 constructed a weight variable using 
results frolll the OLS regression and the sample variance of village means.12 The WLS 
analyses partially correct for the estÎInation problems, but coefficients are still 
underestinla tes. 
Village leaders in the sample share a number of basic characteristics: 
ovenvhelming妙， they are male, cOlllmunist party members, and grew up in the village. 
With practically no variation on these potentially relevant control variables, it Illakes no 
sense to include them in the analysis. There is more variation on other basic 
characteristics, ho\vever, which 1 do include as control variables: village leader's age, 
education, and household income level.13 Results of the OLS and WLS regression 
analyses are presented in table 3. Models 1 and 2 di在er only in the measure of central 
tendency that aggregates positions of villagers on the economic ideology dimension. 
Model 1 uses the village median; Model 2 uses the village mean. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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OLS and WLS regression results are nearly identical, although the smaIler 
standard errors of the WLS regressions show some e旺ect of the correction for 
heteroskedasticity. Control variables are not statisticaIly significant in the models.14 
Turning to the variables of analytic interest, in both models the position of township 
leaders is statisticaIly significant in a direction predicted by congruence. This is not too 
surprising, considering the interest and practical involvement of township selectorates in 
choosing viIlage leaders. It is reassuring, however, that the connection is in fact re f1ected 
in congruence along the economic ideology dimension. As for ordinary viIlagers, 
although the n1edian and mean are very highly correlated, the coef自cients in the two 
models di証er considerably.15 From an inferential perspective, ho\vever, the result is the 
same: both measures of the position of the village n1ass salnple are statistically 
significant, in a direction predicted by congruence. 
The results of the analyses support the conclusion that electorates and selectorates 
n1atter, in a way re f1 ected by comparing positions on the broad, policy-relevant economic 
ideology dinlension. In statistical ternls, village leaders are significantly responsive to 
those who choose them. In substantive terms too, the findings indicate t11at electorates 
and selectorates matter significantly. The amount of responsiveness to electorates, for 
exanlple, can be expressed in the following way. Mean positions of villagers range in 
value from -.33 to 5.1, a range of 5.4 points; multiplying this by the coe血cient for the 
viIlage mean yields a product of 3.6. As the range in positions for viIlage leaders is 13 
points, village electorates can be considered to "move" leaders more than one-fourth of 
this range -- a result that is, in my view, striking in its substantive signi自cance.
Democratization and Congruence Between Village Leaders and Their Electorates 
The finding of substantively and statistically significant congruence between viIlage 
leaders and ordinary viIlagers is consistent with an optimistic view of democratization in 
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the Chinese countryside. Yet, congruence in the vilIages can emerge from processes that 
have nothing to do with democratization. Is congruence between village leaders and 
villagers a product of the changes in rural political organization that prompted this 
inquiry? 
The uneven progress of grassroots democratization supplies the basis for an 
answer. If democratization is an important source of the ideological congruence between 
vilIage leaders and ordinary villagers, then inter-vilIage variation in congruence can be 
expected to re f1ect variation in the institutions, practices, and attitudes associated with 
recent e缸'orts to democratize the vi lIages. Other things equal , leaders in villages that are 
further along in inlplementing the democratizing llleasures of the law on vilIage 
committees will be nearer, on the econolnic ideology dimension , to their village 
constituents than leaders in vi lIages that lag behind in implementation. 
Dependent Val切bles: Proxùn ity and Centrism 
Achen (1978) develops two lneasures of co月ruence in terms of distance between 
leaders and their constituents. The most straightforward measure of congruence as 
distance is pro刃mity (of positions on a dimension) of leaders to constituents. Proxinlity 
is the average squared distance bet\veen a leader and his constituents. 1 estinlate it for 
the sample here by squaring the di証'erence in positions, on the economic ideology 
dimension, of a village leader and each vilI ager 台om the sample of his electorate and 
computing the village nlean of those squared distances. The lower the proximity score, 
the nearer village leaders are to villagers; the higher the proxinlity score, the more 
distant. Congruence lneasured as proximity represents outcomes: it takes no account of 
inter-village di在erences in the shape of the distribution of positions of villagers. Thus 
proXlml句， can be low because vilIagers are sharply divided between extrelnes on tbe 
dimension , making it di伍cult for a village leader who is near the middle of vilIagers to 
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be very near the vilIage average. By contrast, proximity in a very homogeneous vilIage 
can be higher, simply because of a narrower distribution. To analyze congruence 
between leaders and vilIagers, given some distribution of positions in the vilIage, requires 
a measure that takes the variance of the distribution into account. Achen's measure of 
congruence as centrism, which subtracts variance from proximity, does that. 1 estimate 
it here as the di旺'erence between the estimated pro近ml句 (of a leader to vilIagers) and 
the vilIage variance in positions on the economic ideology dünension. As with proximi紗，
the lower the centrism score, the nearer village leaders are to villagers; the higher the 
centrisnl score, the more distan t. Achen (1978: 488) sunlmarizes the intuitive distinction 
between the 趴'0 measures as follo\vs: if prOxi I11ity is a measure of outcolnes, centrism is 
a Ineasure of the leader's perfornlance; whatever the leader's proxilnity, centrism 
measures his ability to minÏInize it. The Í\vo nleasures of congruence as distance are the 
dependent variables in the nlultivariate regression analyses below. 
Independent r旬riables
Because it has speci自c responsibility to ünplement measures on grassroots 
denlocratization , the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its departments under local 
governments investigate progress in inlplementation and publicize local experience. 
Reports and recomlnendations of civil affairs 0伍cials provide excelIent insight into inter-
vilIage variation in democratization and, in so doing, identi有， and substantiate key 
independent variables for the analysis of congruence. To be sure, ideological congruence 
per se never appears as a dependent variable in the accounts, but 。但cials do try to 
explain outcomes such as success (or failure) of candidates to win a m吋ority of votes in 
village elections, strong (or weak) orientations of vilIage leaders to be responsive to 
vilIagers, and good (or poor) relations between village leaders and vilIagers, for example. 
Among the 56 villages surveyed, data on the relevant vilIage committee elections 
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are available for only 26 (spread across nine of the twenty townships, in two counties). 
Unquestionably, some measure of inter-viIIage variation in electoral arrangements is 
crucial to an analysis of the relationship between congruence and democratization. This 
limits the analyses below to those 26 viIIages for which data on elections are available.16 
Electoral Competitiveness. Electoral competitiveness is an important, obvious, and 
easiIy measured index of progress in democratization. Chinese accounts link electoral 
cOlnpetitiveness to mass interest in the elections, voter turnout, and the quality of 
relations between elected leaders and viIIagers. For example, one account describes the 
negative reactions (inc1uding abstention fron1 voting) ofviIIagers to baIIots that are "cakes 
in the pan , waiti時 only for [voters] to go through the motions of lighting the fire" (Zhen 
and Shi 1990). 旭 account of e叫X沖p仰向e叮叫r吋nn訂 1ents w叫it出h 臼削圳11即l抄yc∞O仰mpμ仰川叫叫ti仙ti伽甘ve叫el叫ons conc1udes that 
more competition prolnotes mass interest in the elections and produces winners with a 
stronger orientation to selve the vi11agers (Fujian Provincial DepartInent of Civil A釘aus
In the 26 villages for which data are available, elections were uncompetitive in 
three: 自ve candidates were listed for five positions. Most viIIages listed about a third 
again as many candidates as positions. The most con1petitive elections (in three vi11ages) 
listed more than 趴70-thirds again as many candidates as positions. The lneasure of 
electoral competitiveness in the analyses below is the proportion of candidates that voters 
can reject in fi11ing vi11age cOll1mittee positions (without resorting to write-in candidates) 
一 that 色， number of excess candidates divided by number of positions. To the degree 
that elections 。在'er them choices, vilIagers can reject candidates with positions distant 
from tbeir own in favor of candidates nearer to them. As higher values reÐect greater 
competitiveness and greater opportunity for vilIagers to reject some candidates in favor 
of others, the predicted relationship between electoral competitiveness and proximi句7and
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centrism is negative: other things equal, the greater the competitiveness, the smalIer the 
distance beÍ\veen leaders and villagers. 
Interest in Elections, Voter Turnout, and Attendance at Meetings. If organized 
according to official guidelines, village elections 0旺'er villagers several opportunities to 
participate even before voting. These include study sessions to learn about their rights 
and the functions of the new village conlmittees, infornlal group deliberations to propose 
and discuss potential nominees for positions on the committees, and village meetings to 
nOlninate candidates and then hear those on the 自nal balIot defend their qualifications 
for leadership. Actual response to these opportunities to participate varies greatly. At 
one extreme , for exanlple, viPagers in an Anhui village nominated 83 candidates and held 
five voting sessions to elect their village conunittee, but vi l1agers in many other localities 
relnain uninterested and participate only after Inobilizational efforts by election 
organizers (Zha時 1992).
Up to the nlid-1980s, Chinese peasants generally ignored elections as a nleans of 
in f1uencing public affairs , allowing officials at higher levels to dominate selection of 
leaders. Peasants voted , but this was a political ritual to \vhich they attached littIe 
practical significance (Burns 1988). Chinese accounts often attribute peasant apathy 
about more recent elections (considered a sign of low "dεmocratic c∞O郎CIO叩
levels of education in the c∞ountrηy屯叫S討ide and the lack of e位xper吋ience with democracy 
historically. 
Interest (or lack of interest) in the elections has obvious inlplications for 
congruence between village leaders and viIIagers: insofar as villagers persist in viewing 
elections as largely irrelevant channels of in f1 uence, that view can be self-fulfi lIing. 
Peasants who see the elections as useful channels to in f1uence village a証aus are more 
likely, for example, to become informed about candidates, perhaps even to bave 
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influenced candidate selection. By contrast, votes of completely uninterested villagers 
are sin1Ílar to randonl draws of candidates from the ballot. To the degree that votes 
correspond to randonl draws, the relationship be仰een positions of voters and positions 
of winners will also be random. 
The most direct attitudinal measure of interest in village elections from the survey 
instrunlent is an itenl that asks mass respondents to indicate their level of interest in 
village elections by choosing one of fo盯 responses (ranging 台om 市ot interested" to "very 
interested"). For the analyses below, the measure of interest in village elections is the 
village mean of responses to that item. It ranges from 1.8 to 3.4 in the 26 villages. As 
higher values re f1ect greater interest, the predicted relationship be仰een interest and 
prOXll111可 and centrism is negative: other things equal, the higher the interest in village 
elections in the village, the snlalIer the distance between vi lIage leaders and vilIagers. 
Behavioral indicators can also reflect interest in vi lIage elections. The lllost 
obvious is voter turnou t: villagers \vho are really not interested in the elections will not 
vote in them. Voter turnout in the relevant village elections is part of the data available 
for 26 of the vi lIages surveyed . Average voter turnout for those villages is 88 percent, 
with values ranging from 59 to 97 percent. A second, less obvious, behavioral indicator 
is attendance at village meetings. Villagers who are interested in village affairs (and who 
consider formal channels of influence use臼1) are likely to attend village meetings, 
including meetings that nominate candidates for village committee positions and publicize 
candidate qualifications. Mass respondents in the survey were asked whether or not they 
had attended a recent village meeting. From valid responses to that itenl, 1 constructed 
a village-level measure of attendance at village meetings as the percentage of respondents 
who indicated they had attended a recent village meeting. The mean across all 26 
villages is 50 percent, with individual village values dispersed across practically the full 
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range --台om 0 to 94 percent. 
As indicators of interest in vilIage elections, however, these apparently obvious 
behavioral measures may be problematic. Burns (1988) notes tbat before the recent 
changes in political organization, local elections and nleetings had a strong mobilizational 
character. Even in recent years, voter turnout and attendance at village meetings may 
re f1ect better the ability of election organizers and vilIage leaders to mobilize villages 
tban the level of mass interest in the elections and village a旺airs. 1 t is obvious from 
Chinese accounts that high voter turnout and high levels of participation in candidate 
nOlnination are accepted as important indicators of success in grassroots delnocratization. 
Because they are easily quantifiable indicators, they are also useful criteria for higher-
level evaluations of to\vnship perfornlance in organlzlng the elections 一 and this 
transforms thenl into perfornlance targets for townships and viIIages. Moreover, at least 
sOlne provlnces 。他cially stipulate min Îlnum voter turnout rates (usuaIIy 50 percent) for 
viIIage elections to be declared valid (see, e.g., Standing COlnmittee of the Seventh 
Fujian Provincial People's Congress 26 Dec. 1990). 
If voter turnout and attendance at village meetings are essentially products of 
lnobilization , tbey can be unrelated to interest in elections and congruence between 
vilIage leaders and viIlages. Mobilization for high voter turnout can also re f1ect an 
authoritarian approach to organizing the elections; bigh attendance at viIlage meetings 
can re f1ect strong mass dissatisfaction with election outcomes. If so, high voter tumout 
and attendance at viIlage meetings can be negatively related to congruence. Finally, if 
both e在'ects are opera ting, they can 0旺set one anotber. For these reasons, 1 do not 
specI有， a direction of relationship between tbese Í\vo behaviorallneasures and proximity 
and centrism. 1 include tbese measures in the analyses below for two reasons: the 
plausibility of their relationship to congruence (in one way or anotber) , and the 
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plausibility of their correlation with electoral competitiveness and the attitudinal measure 
of interest in village elections (which implies they should not be left in the error term) . 
Village Size. Chinese accounts indicate that it is more difficult to get villagers to 
participate in the meetings and other activities associated with elections when villages are 
large or the population is widely dispersed (see Qi 1990, Zhen and Shi 1990, Cunmin 
zhijie minzhu de you yi ci shijian 1991 , Zha月 1992). As a result, in those villages, 
villagers are less knowledgeable about their rights, village committee functions, and 
qualifications of specific candidates for leadership. Elections in larger villages are thus 
nlore formalistic than in smaller villages.17 Village size has direct ünplications for 
congruence between village leaders and villagers because of its presumed relationship to 
informed voting. The accounts not only identify village size as an intrinsic analytic 
variable, they also indicate a relationship between village size and other independent 
variables (such as voter turnout and attendance at village meetings) in tbe analyses. 
Tbe 26 villages in the sample vary significantly in population size: two are 
populated by fewer than 500 villagers; four bave populations of over 2000.18 There are 
a number of ways to construct a measure to analyze the relationsbip be1:\veen village size 
and congruence, but Cbinese accounts certainly suggest an indicator variable. Deciding 
what constitutes a large village is not completely arbitrary. A couple of the accounts that 
discuss problematic "large villages" are specific: electorate size is 1520 in one and 1400 
in another (Zhen and Shi 1990, Cunmin zhijie mi也hu de you yi ci shijian 1991). With 
these accounts as a reference point, 1 constructed a large village indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 for villages with electorates at or above 1400 and 0 for smaller 
villages. The predicted relationship be t\veen large village size and proximity and centrism 
is positive: other things equal, villagers in large villages are more distant from their 
leaders, compared to villagers in smaller villages. 
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Incumbency. The independent variables discussed above all consider congruence 
between village leaders and villagers as a product of processes associated with recent 
efforts at grassroots democratization. These processes relate essentially to electoral 
choice, that is, choices villagers make as voters. An alternative set of explanations for 
inter-village variation in congruence focuses instead on choices village leaders make. 
Leaders who have more experience in positions of village leadership nlay be significantly 
nearer (or more distant) to their village constituents on a policy-relevant dimension such 
as economic ideology. 
L疋aderswith 1110re experience in village leadership may better represent prevailing 
issue orientations of villagers because they are better able to represent thenl: they know 
the vi lIagers and their positions better. The more falniliar a leader is with where the 
average vilIager stands, the better able he is to place hünself at that position . Thus inter-
village variation in congruence between village leaders and vi lIages can simply re f]ect 
variation in bow fanliliar vi lIage leaders are \vith views in their constituency. Holding a 
position of leadership in tbe village provides leaders \vith the incentive and opportunity 
to learn where villagers stand on policy-relevant issues that a旺Cct their daily lives. By 
this reasoning, more experienced village leaders know their constituents better and, for 
this reason, are better able to represent them. 
In 1990, however, the more experienced village leaders are those who held power 
in the period before villagers elected leaders in semi -competitive elections to the ne\v 
village committees. The more experienced village leaders are those who measured up 
to standards applied by the higher-level authorities dominating selection. Experienced 
village leaders in the sample are experienced and successful at satisfying higher levels 
and, therefore, may be more secure in their positions of leadership. By tbis reasoning, 
more experienced village leaders have Iess need to represent villagers in their respective 
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constItuencies. 
A measure of experience in viIlage leadership can be constructed frolll detailed 
career history data that viIlage leaders provided in respollse to specific questions. 1 
summed up, for each leader sU lVeyed in the 26 vilIages, the number of years reported in 
any position of leadership at the vilIage level to create an inculllbency variable for the 
analyses below. For the 26 vilIage leaders in the sample, the variable takes values 台om
1 to 38 years in a position of vi lIage leadership, with a mean of 17 years across villages. 
As the discussion above is ambivalent about the direction of the variable's e缸'e ct ， 1 do 
not specify a predicted direction of relationship bet\veen incunlbency and proximity and 
centrislll. 
1 also inc1ude village-levellneasures of inCOllle and education in the analyses as 
control variables. InCOlne is 1990 mean per capita income in the village. 19 Education is 
from the sU lVey data: it is the nlean years of fonnal schooling of nlass respondents. 
Results are presented in table 4. Where a direction of e缸'ect is predicted, the test 
of statistical significance is one-tailed. Otherwise, the test is t\vo-tailed. For illustrative 
purposes, the table presents 趴'0 regressions with proximity as the dependent variable. 
The second inc1udes variance in positions of villagers as an independent variable. This 
is similar to considering the e旺'ect (on pro近mity) of di在ere叫 shapes of village 
distributions as an argument about model misspecification. That argunlent predicts a 
positive relationship between variance and proximity. As village leaders cannot be as 
near to the vilIage average in villages with a wider spread of positions, compared to more 
homogeneous viIlages, the higher the variance, the more distant the village leader to 
villagers, other things equal. A comparison of the 趴'0 proximity models highlights the 
effect of the distribution shape on congruence. 
28 
[Table 4 about here] 
Despite some fairly strong correlations between independent variables (which can 
present a multicollinearity problem) and the small number of observations, the e旺'ect of 
a11 but one of the sÏx variables of analytic interest is statistically significant and in the 
predicted direction, \vhere a direction is specified, when variance in the shape of 
distributions in the vi11ages is included (on either side of the equation). The e証'ect of 
incumbency is statistically insignificant, which may be due to the 0証setting of e在'ects in 
opposite directions. 
T\\TO sets of results stand out in the analyses. The first has to do with grassroots 
democratization. Electoral competitiveness, the most obvious, unambiguous, and reliably 
measured index of grassroots democratization , is statistica11y significant in the predicted 
direction in a11 three models. NOÍ\vithstanding the interest and capacity of township 
selectorates to intluence which candidates appear on final ba11ots, villagers choose the 
winners; the more opportunity vi11agers have to reject some candidates in favor of others, 
the nearer \vinners are to the vi11agers who choose them. The signi自cance of having 
choices, which seems rather trite in the abstract, is an important finding here because it 
o宜'ers empirical reassurance that context, however di釘'erent， can only make so much 
di在'erence: other things equal, in Chinese villages as in many other contexts, voter choice 
and representation go together. Related旬， not only do institutions such as competitive 
elections a在ect congruence between leaders and vi11agers, but also attitudes associated 
with democratization are important. Other things equal, congruence between leaders 
and vi11agers is in significant pa此 a product of how interested villagers are in the 
electoral process that produces their leaders. Where vi11agers are more interested in that 
process, the result is leaders who are signi自cantly closer to them. 
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A second set of results suggests the relevance of context, although they are less 
clearcut in interpretation. They likely have to do with mobilization. In all three models, 
the relationship between proximi可 and centrism and attendance at village meetings is 
significant and positive. In models that take variance in mass positions into account, the 
e在ect of voter tumout is similarly significant and positive. Certainly, these 趴70
behavioral measures may in fact nleasure di旺erent things. Nonetheless, the 
straightforward empirical finding is that, at the village level of analysis, higher levels of 
participation in these activities are associated with greater distance between village 
leaders and villagers. One reasonable explanation is that in 1990, as in the past, both 
measures re f1ect the ability of higher authorities (at the township and village levels) 的
mobilize the peasant lnasses to participate in not altogether voluntary activities. A clear 
inlplication of O'Brien's (1994) account of implementation of the "complex and perhaps 
contradictory combination of goals" of the law on village conlmittees is that 
representative leadership in auton01110US villages is not always the sort of leadership 
associated \vith successful execution of unpopular state assignments. Village leaders who 
are better at mobilizing the masses may be poorer at representing them. 
Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this paper look for, and find , a connection between 
leaders and citizens of a sort that has, for obvious reasons, not been prominent in the 
study of communist politics, much less peasant politics in one of the world's few 
remaining communist countries. Despite the important changes in Chinese village 
organization and the 0的cial (and unofficial) enthusiasm about grassroots democratization 
that prompted this inquiry, it is surely the case that the null hypothesis of no significant 
congruence beÍ\veen village leaders and villagers, along a policy-relevant dimension such 
as the economic ideology dimension employed here, is at least as plausible as its 
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alternate. The findings of statistically and substantively significant congruence between 
village leaders and their constituents are thus a little surprising. Moreover, congruence 
between village leaders and villagers is not (or not exclusively) a product of informal 
inf1uences in small village communities. 1t results in significant part from the institutions 
and attitudes associated with recent e証'orts at grassroots democratization. There is also 
signi自cant congruence along the economic ideology dÍlnension between village leaders 
and their township selectorates, which is perhaps not surprising, although the null 
hypothesis is still by no means a stra\v man. 
The questions posed in the analyses above di旺'er somewhat, as is approp討ate ，
from those posed about congruence in established liberal democracies. 1n the liberal 
democratic context, political scientists can reasonably assullle significant congruence 
related to denlocratic processes and move on to lllore interesting analytical questions 
about congruence. It may be sOlne time yet before research on Chinese politics can 
similarly treat congruence be t\veen leaders and citizens as routine. Moreover, although 
the data used here are unsuitable for estimating the aUlount of congruence in Chinese 
villages (see Manion 1994), there is nothing in the analyses to suggest grassroots 
democratization (or any other process, for that matter) has produced responsiveness, 
proximity, or centrism in amounts comparable to the estimates for liberal democracies. 
Nor should \ve e:xpect this, considering the ambivalent character of democracy in the 
socialist context. Chinese political reform, bold as it is in that context, has by no means 
quite abandoned the Leninist p~radigm of representation of objective mass interests for 
the liberal deUlocratic paradigm of representation of subjective mass preferences. 
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NOTES 
1. The counties are located in Anh凶， Hunan, Hebei, and Tianjin. Townships are a 
strati自ed probabili句 sample of five townships representing di旺'erent population and 
income strata within each county. Villages are a probability proportionate to size sample 
of three (administrative) villages within each selected township. Data from only 56 of 
the sÏx句T villages surveyed are employed in this analysis. Interviewers were unable to 
locate a village leader for interviewing in one of the villages, and three village leaders 
failed to respond to one of the items used to construct positions on the economic 
ideology dinlension. 
2. A left-right dimension has the attractive feature of ideological breadth, which is 
particularly important for the analysis of congruence. We cannot meaningfully aggregate 
preferences of citizens on nlany specific issues to come up with an unambiguous 
evaluation of representation. Positions on the left-rigbt dÏIn~nsion offer a solution as 
they fairly reliably reflect orientations to nlany issues on a single dimension (see Huber 
1989). In tbe Chinese context, "left" and "right" are provocative terms, witb a political 
meaning that changes frequently. Thus even if the terms were not viewed as too 
politically sensitive to inc1ude in a survey instrument (or, in this analysis, too abstract for 
peasants) , this situation nlakes self-placement of Chinese respondents on a left-right 
dinlension difficult to interpret substantively. 
3. The official figure is one in t\velve households, but Odegaard (1992) estinlates the 
actual nunlber as c10ser to one in seven. 
4. Respondents \\'ere a1so asked to evaluate the ÏInportance of coIIective enterprises for 
economic deve10pnlent. 1 do not use responses to this question because there is no 
unanlbiguous interpretation of the importance of collective enterprises in a broader 
ideological sense. Most rural coIIective enterprises are managed by the to\vnship 
governlnent or vi11age administration: as such, they combine adlninistrative management 
and local initiative, sharing features of state and individual enterprises. This intermediate 
status, which frustrates an ideological interpretation of responses, is reflected in Pearson 
correlations of responses evaluating the importance of the three forms of enterprises. 
Evaluations of state and collective enterprises are highly correlated (.47 for masses, .51 
for leaders) , as are evaluations of collective and individual enterprises (.47 for masses. , 
.35 for leaders). By contrast, respondents distinguish c1early between state and individual 
enterprises: correlation coe自cients for evaluations of these two fonns of enterprise are 
relatively low (.12 for masses, .14 for leaders). 
5. Note that while electorates are unique to village leaders in the sanlple, leaders in 
villages located in the same township have the same selectorate. As there are twenty 
selectorates for the 56 village leaders, each is a selectorate for four or five of the village 
leaders. 
6. Among 1096 completed mass interviews in the 56 villages, 34 percent of respondents 
repo此ed no position on one or both items, yielding 721 valid observations for analysis 
in the mass sample. Nearly half of a11 cases dropped because of missing data are 
respondents with no formal schooling. The mass sample used for the analysis of 
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congruence does nonetheless include 119 respondents with no schooling, accounting for 
17 percent of the sample (sti1110wer than the 28 percent of mass respondents with whom 
interviews were compl的d and who have no schooling). Anlong respondents with at 
least some schooling, there is little di旺erence in the education distribution of a11 mass 
respondents with whom interviews were completed and that of the subsample of 
respondents who responded to both items. 
7. A separate analysis of variance, aggregating responses in the nlass sample by vi11age, 
indicates inter-vi11age variation significant at the .05 level. 
8. 1 selected as dependent variables twelve items from the survey instrument that, in 
principle, tap positions on questions of economic ideology. In eight of the twelve 
regression analyses, economic ideology is significant in the predicted direction, with a 
level of statistical significance at at least .05 for six i江te臼ms
tailed t伽e臼S叫 T刊he i此tenls 仰叫nnlan叫 in the te泣 Specific questions are as fo11ows 
Two regression analyses feature dependent variables selected fr_om a feeling thermometer 
batte吼 which asks respondents to indicate feelings (on a 100-point scale) about 10,000-
yuan households and private retailers. A third regression analysis elnploys responses to 
the foIIowing question as tbe dependent variable: "How detrÏInental do you think the 
econonlic refonns have been for this county? Would you say negative effects of the 
refonns aUlount to a great many, many, some, or only a few?" Five regression analyses 
feature as dependent variables 的ponses (on a four-point scale) indicating views ranging 
froln strong agreement to strong disagreenlent with the foIIowing statelnents: "For the 
vast majority, the open Inarket bas not provided opportunities to get rich. 1I "The open 
market is a Inajor cause of nSlng prices." "It is better not to start up individual 
enterprises, because there is a cbance they \viII fai l." "Inconle ceilings should be set to 
prevent very large incollle inequalities." "It is alright if those who start up individual 
enterprises have higher incomes than the average person." 
9. If positions on tbe dimension are distributed sYlnmetricaIIy in the population , the 
choice of a measure of central tendency is moot, as a practical issue, regardless of 
whether the tbeoretical interest is the median or the mean: the mean is the most efficient 
estimator of the population median (as we11 as the population Inean). If tbe distribution 
is not symmetrical, however, tben the principle of analogy suggests tbe sample median 
as the estimator of the population median. 1 do not assume positions on the economic 
ideology dimension are distributed symmetrically in the population of interest. 
10. Note tbat the problenl does not present itself for selectorates: as eacb selectorate 
sanlple contains only 趴10 township leaders, the median equals the mean. 
11. This summary fails to reflect the tremendous variety of electoral practices in the 
villages, but it is not inconsiste_Rt with any 1 have encountered in my readings. 
12. Let: yi = economic ideology position of village leader in viIIage i, mi = true 
economic ideology position of tbe mean of viIIagers in viIIage i, ~ = estimated econonlic 
ideology position of the mean of viIIagers in village i, Zi = vector of control variables for 
village i, vi = measurement error in economic ideology position of the mean of viIIagers 
in village i, and ~ = mi + vi. Then the true model is: yi = a + b mi + IZ j + e j . The 
estimated model is: yi = a + b (只 -Vi)+lzi+ei or yi=a +bR+|Zi+ei-bvi.The 
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disturbance in the estimated model is: ei . bvi, and the weight variable for WLS is an 
estimate of the reciprocal of the square root of its variance. An estimate of variance (ei) 
is: (standard error of the 0凶 regression)2. And an estimate of variance (bvi) is: b 2 . 
sample variance of the mean of vi11agers in vi11age i. Let: w = (standard error of the 
O凶 regression)2 + b 2 . sample variance of the mean of vi11agers in vi11age i. Then the 
weight variable for WLS is: w-l12• The weight variable for the WLS model that uses the 
nlass median, instead of the mean, as the measure of central tendency for vilIage mass 
position is constructed from the standard error and coe血cient 台om the OLS regression 
for that model, but uses the sample variance of the vi11age meal1 to estimate vi . 
13. Age is year of birth, education is years of schooIing, and household income level is 
an ordinal variable t11at categorizes reported household income for 1989 (in叫ch吋1I時 sa叫叫larηy，
subsidies, pensions, and payments in kind) in 500-yuan brackets, from under 500 yuan 
to 10,000 yuan and over. 
14. The Pearson correlation of age and education is .41. Age is not statisticalIy 
slgnl自cant when education is excluded; education achieves significance at tbe .10 level 
when age is excluded. The lack of statistical significance for control variables nlay reflect 
the snlalIer variance on these variables (e.g. , relative to a lnass sample) and not the 
inherent irrelevance of age or inconle as predictors of econonlic ideology. In a separate 
individual-Ievel regression model of the mass salnple using age , sex, education, and 
household incolne Ievel as independent variables and position on the econonlic ideology 
dinlension as the dependent variable , age , sex, and incollle are a11 statistica11y signi自cant
at at least the .05 leveI. When age is taken out of the nlodel , education is statisticalIy 
significan t. 
15. This is not due to a Iimitation of the data: the nledian position of villagers bas higher 
variance than the mean (1.8, cOlnpared to 1.2). The Pearson correlation coe也cient for 
tbe two nleasures is .83. 
16. Data on vi11age elections are colIected at the township level, by the townsbip 
department of civil affairs. Tbe fact that data are lacking on elections in tbe otber 30 
vi11ages suggests that the tO\V叫lips (and , for the Inost part, counties) in wbich those 
vi11ages are located had not made a serious effort to implelnent the draft law on vilIage 
conlmittees by 1990, when tbe survey was conducted. Dropping 30 obselvations from an 
already small sample is obviously not ideaI. But it is tenuous to assume, for example, for 
the purpose of facilitating analysis, that the 30 vi11ages for which data are lacking are 
uniformly cases of "less competitiveness" in the choice of vi11age leaders, compared to 
those vi11ages in the sample which we know held semi-competitive elections. More to the 
point, such an assumption ultimately serves littIe purpose, as the multivariate analyses 
of congruence enlploy not only data on electoral competitiveness but also data on voter 
turnout (both of which turn out to be statistica11y signi自ca叫.
17. Some large vi11ages have formed representative assemblies (see esp. Lawrence 1994), 
but this does not solve the problenl described here because a handful of representatives 
sometimes do a11 the candidate 的mination and selection (see Zhen and Shi 1990). 
18. These figures are for 1988 village population size. 
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19. Many Chinese accounts discuss the importance of a strong village collective economy 
as a factor in e釘'ective vilIage committees. This is more likely related to e旺'ective
execution of state assignments rather than congruence (see O'Brien 1994), but it may 
have an indirect e在'ect on congruence. If so, the e旺'ect may be captured by the income 
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Table 1. Changes in Rural Administrative Organization, 1978-93 
People's Production Townships Village Village 
Year Communes Brigades and Towns Committees Committee Cadres 
1978 52,534 686,666 
52,781 690,000 
1979 53,229 701 ,288 
53,348 699,000 
1980 54,183 709,820 
1981 54,368 718,022 
1982 54,352 719,438 
1983 36,268 38,482 311 ,681 
40,079 550,484 16,252 199,657 
1984 63 92,476 927,311 
249 7,046 91 ,171 926,439 
1985 91 ,590 948,628 3,795 ,958 
91 ,138 940,617 
1986 72,135 866,130 3,658,861 
71 ,521 847,894 
1987 69,842 845 ,025 3,598,751 
68,490 830,302 
1988 56,676 882,564 3,665,566 
56,002 740,375 
1989 56,497 934,346 3,793,816 
55 ,764 746,432 
1990 56,481 1,001 ,272 4,094,494 
55 ,838 743,278 
1991 55 ,109 1,018,593 4,243,883 
55 ,542 804,153 
1992 48,366 1,004,349 4,308,878 
48,250 806,032 
1993 48,200 802,400 
Sources: Ministry of Civil A旺airs ， Bureau of Planning and Financial A証'airs ， ed. , Minzheng 
tongji lishi ziliao huibian [Collection of historical statistics on civil a旺airs] (Beijing: n.p. , 1993), 
4-15; Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1980 [1980 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye 
chubanshe, 1981)，只 Zhongguo nongye ni州的n 1981 [1981 agricultural yearbook of China] 
(Be站ing: Nongye chubanshe, 1982), 9; Zhongguo nongye n圳的n 1982 [1982 agricultural 
yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1983)，的 Zhongguo nongye n圳的n 1983 
[1983 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: No時ye chubanshe, 1984), 19; Zhongguo 
nongye nianjian 1984 [1984 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 
1984), 67; Zhongguo nongye 肌肉jian 1985 [1985 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: 
Nongye chubanshe, 1985), 121; Zhongguo nongye n圳的n 1986 [1986 agricultural yearbook 
of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1986), 151; Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1987 [1987 
agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: No月ye 伽banshe ， 1987), 196; Zhongguo nongye 
nianjian 1988 [1988 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1988), 213; 
Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1989 [1989 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye 
chubanshe, 1989), 240; Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1990 [1990 agricultural yearbook of China] 
(Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1990), 246; Zhongguo nongye 1仰'ljian 1991 [1991 agricultural 
yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1991), 278; Zhonggω nongye nianjian 1992 
[1992 agricultural yearbook of China] (B吋ing: Nongye 伽banshe ， 1992), 270; Zhongguo 
nongye nianjian 1993 [1993 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 
1993), 238; Zhongguo tongji n圳的n 1994 [1994 statistical yearbook of China] (B吋lng:
Zho時guo tongji chubanshe, 1994), 17. 
Note: As there are large discrepancies between some figures available from the Ministry of 
Civil A証airs and those published in other statistical yearbooks, the table presents 制'0 sets of 
自gures where available. 1980 and 1982 日gures and 1983-84 production brigade figures , for 
which 1 am unable to find a Ministry of Civil A旺airs source, are from the agricultural 
yearbooks noted above; 1981 日gures are the same in both sources; 1993 figures are from the 
1994 statistical yearbook noted above. For all other years, figures in the first row are from 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs statistical colIection, and figures in the second row are from the 
agricultural yearbooks. Discrepancies for 1983 and 1984 are neither surprising nor 
substantively very important: the major administrative changes took place in those years, and 
D10St village committees were simply production brigades renamed. Large discrepancies in 
figures for vi lIage committees beginning in 1988 may re f1ect an undercounting of new 
committees constituted at the level of the former production teams. The Organic Law on 
Village Committees, which came into e旺'ect in 1988, stated that village committees were to 
be established at that level (although in practice most remained at the level of the former 
production brigades). As an integral pa此 of its responsibility to investigate and promote 
organizations of political power at the grassroots, the Ministry of Civil A宜airs specifically 
collects data on rural administration. It possesses the capacity to be the more reliable source 
but also the incentive to present higher numbers of village committees to demonstrate the 
importance or success of its e缸orts.
TabIe 2. Positions on Economic IdeoIogy Dimension 
Position Masses VilIage Leaders Township Leaders 
(%) (%) (%) 
+10 1.8 3.6 5.0 
+9 1.9 O 2.5 
+8 3.5 5.4 2.5 
+7 5.7 5.4 5.0 
+6 8.7 10.7 2.5 
+ 5 12.2 16.1 5.0 
+4 10.0 16.1 22.5 
+ 3 9.4 10.7 10.0 
+2 13.5 14.3 15.0 
+ 1 7.5 5.4 7.5 
O 15.0 7.1 12.5 
3.9 3.6 O 
- 2 2.4 1.8 O 
- 3 1.9 O O 
- 4 0.8 O O 
- 5 1.2 O O 
- 6 0.3 O O 
- 7 0.1 O O 
- 8 O O O 
- 9 O O O 
-10 0.1 O O 
100% 100% 100% 
N=721 N=56 N=40 
Note: Position values are the respondent's reported position on the 
importance of state enterprises for economic development minus 
reported position on the importance of individual enterprises for 
economic development. 
Table 3. Responsiveness of Village Leaders to Electorates and Selectorates 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Model1 Mode12 
OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Median position of village masses .39* .39* 
(.28) (.28) 
Mean position of village masses .67** .67** 
(.33) (.33) 
Median/mean position of to\vnship leaders .38** .38** .39** .39** 
(.19) (.19) (.19) (.19) 
Village leader's age .016 .016 .018 .017 
(.055) (.055) (.053) (.053) 
Village leader's education .18 .18 .18 .18 
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) 
Village leader's income level .069 .069 .084 .084 
(.14) (.14) (.13) (.13) 
Intercept -31 -31 -36 -35 
(108) (108) (103) (104) 
R2 .13 .13 .16 .16 
Standard error of the regression 2.6 1.6 2.6 1.6 
Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses 
** significant at .05 (one-tailed test) 
* significant at .10 (one-tailed test) 
N =56 villages 
Note: See text for description of variables. 
Table 4. Proximity and Centrism of Village Leaders to Their Electorates: 
Explaining Inter-Village Variation in Congruence 
Independent Variables Coe自cients
Centrism Proximity 1 Proximi句 2
Electoral competitiveness -55** -48* -62村
(29) (33) (30) 
Interest in viIlage elections -17* -9.4 -24** 
(12) (13) (13) 
Voter turnout .56t .52 .60• 
(.33) (.37) (.33) 
Attendance at village meetings .48汁 . .37• . 58什
(.17) (.19) (.1月
Village size 13* 10 15** 
(8.4) (9.4) (8.5) 
Incumbency -.21 -.25 -.18 
(.30) (.34) (.30) 
Village mean per capita income -.0038 -.0048 -.0028 
(.013) (.015) (.013) 
Education -1.4 -2.4 -.51 
(3.7) (4.2) (3 .8) 
Variance in mass positions 1.9** 
(.78) 
Intercept 6.6 11 2.9 
(43) (48) (43) 
R2 .44 .33 .51 
Standard error of the regression 15 16 14 
Standard errors of coe伍cients in parentheses 
•• signi自cant at .05 (two-tailed test) 
• significant at .10 (two-tailed test) 
** signl自cant at .05 (one-tailed test) 
* significant at .10 (one-tailed test) 
N = 26 villages 
Note: See text for description of variables. 
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